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Abstract 
The “financial crisis” and its sequel, the current sovereign debt crisis, appear to be the latest 
permutations of an old conflict between capitalism and democracy that forcefully reasserted itself after 
the end of the postwar growth period. Present calamities were preceded by high inflation in the late 
1960s and 1970s, rising public deficits in the 1980s, and growing private indebtedness in the 1990s 
and 2000s. In each case, governments were faced with popular demands for prosperity and security 
that were incompatible with an allocation of life chances by free markets alone. Rather than the result 
of faulty economic management, inflation, deficits and financial under-regulation must be understood 
as temporary stopgaps to satisfy democratic-political claims for “social justice” alongside economic-
capitalist requirements of profitability and distribution by marginal productivity. The risks associated 
with the inherent contradictions of democratic capitalism may have increased in recent years, with 
potentially disruptive consequences for the social integration of democratic polities as well as for the 
system integration of advanced market economies. 
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What can a social scientist contribute to our understanding of that world-shaking event, the crisis of 
the American financial system that broke into the open in 2008 and has since turned into an economic 
and fiscal crisis of global dimension? Nobody will expect a sociologist to offer practical advice as to 
how to repair the damage and prevent similar disasters in the future: what “stress tests” to apply to 
banks; what capital reserves to require them to hold; or whether to create and how to design a bailout 
mechanism for bankrupt states belonging to a currency union. In one sense, of course, this is too bad 
as there are obviously no consulting fees to collect here for those of us who happen not to be certified 
economists. On the other hand, however, regrettable as this may be, it may actually be an advantage as 
it makes it unnecessary for sociologists or political scientists to accept as a premise that in principle at 
least there does exist a fix for the problem that one only needs to find.  
Unlike the economic mainstream, sociology in particular, unless it has given in to fashionable 
pressures to convert to a “rational choice” model of social order, or alternatively has failed to leave 
behind the Parsonian functionalism of the 1950s, is in no way compelled to conceive of society as 
governed by a general tendency toward equilibrium, where crises and change are no more than 
temporary deviations from what is for most of the time the steady state of a normally well-integrated 
social system. Rather than having to construe our present affliction as a singular disturbance of a 
fundamental condition of stability, a sociological, i.e., not efficiency-theoretical approach to political 
economy can afford to try out a historical perspective relating today’s crisis to earlier, similar events 
and exploring the possibility of their being systematically related, by both common causes and 
historical sequence. In fact this is what I will do in this lecture, in which I will suggest considering the 
Great Recession (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009) and the subsequent near-collapse of the modern tax 
state’s public finances as a manifestation of an underlying basic tension in the political-economic 
configuration of advanced capitalist societies, one that makes disequilibrium and instability the rule 
rather than the exception, and that has found expression in a historical succession of different but 
cognate disturbances of the socio-economic order. 
More specifically, I will argue that the present crisis can be fully understood only when 
considered as a stage in an ongoing, inherently conflictual evolution and transformation of that very 
particular social formation that we call democratic capitalism. Democratic capitalism came to be more 
or less safely established only after the Second World War and only in the Western part of the world. 
There it functioned extraordinarily well for the next two to three decades – so well in fact that this 
period, which was one of uninterrupted economic growth, still dominates our ideas and expectations of 
what modern capitalism (Shonfield 1965) is or should and could be. This is true in spite of the fact that 
looked at with hindsight and in the light of the turbulences that followed, the quarter century 
immediately after the war should without difficulty be recognizable as truly exceptional. Indeed I 
suggest that it is not the trente glorieuses (Judt 2005) but the series of crises that followed that is 
representative of the normal condition of democratic capitalism. That condition, I maintain, is 
governed by an endemic and essentially irreconcilable conflict between capitalist markets and 
democratic politics that, having been temporarily suspended for the historically short period 
immediately following the war, forcefully reasserted itself when high economic growth came to an 
end in the 1970s. I will now in general terms discuss the nature of that conflict before I turn to the 
sequence of political-economic disturbances produced by it that preceded as well as shaped the present 
global crisis. 
 
I. 
Suspicions that capitalism and democracy may not easily go together are far from new. Beginning in 
the nineteenth and well into the twentieth century, the bourgeoisie and the political Right were afraid 
that majority rule, being inevitably the rule of the poor over the rich, would ultimately do away with 
private property and free markets. The rising working class and the political Left, for their part, were 
fearful of capitalists allying themselves with the forces of reaction to abolish democracy, so as to 
protect themselves from being governed by a permanent majority dedicated to redistribution of 
economic advantage and social status. I will not here discuss the relative merits of the two positions, 
although I believe that, unfortunately, at least in the industrialized world the Left had more reason to 
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fear the Right overthrowing democracy in order to save capitalism, than the Right had to be afraid of 
the Left abolishing capitalism for the sake of democracy. What was true, however, was that in the 
years immediately after the Second World War it was a widely shared belief that in order to be 
compatible with democracy, capitalism and capitalists had to be subjected to extensive political 
control,1 rather than democracy having to be restrained in the name of free market capitalism. While 
Keynes and, to an extent, Kalecki and Polanyi carried the day, Hayek had to withdraw into temporary 
exile. 
This was not to remain so, however. Today’s political economy literature, to the extent that it 
comes out of mainstream economics, is obsessed with the figure of the opportunistic or myopic, in any 
case irresponsible politician who caters to an economically uneducated electorate by fiddling with 
otherwise efficient markets and thereby preventing them from achieving equilibrium – all in pursuit of 
objectives, like full employment and social justice, that truly free markets would in the long run 
deliver anyway but must fail to deliver if distorted by politics. Economic crises, according to standard 
economic theories of “public choice” (Buchanan and Tullock 1962) essentially stem from political 
intervention, or better: from market-distorting intervention for “social” objectives, whereas the right 
kind of intervention is one that sets markets free, above all from interference by electoral politics. 
Market-distorting intervention, in turn, derives from an excess of democracy, or more precisely: from 
democracy being carried over by irresponsible politicians into the economy where it has no business.  
Not many go today as far as the formidable Friedrich von Hayek, who in his later years 
advocated abolishing democracy as we know it in defense of economic freedom and civil liberty . 
Still, the cantus firmus of current neo-institutionalist economic theory sounds very Hayekian indeed: 
for capitalism to work, it requires a rule-bound economic policy, constitutionally enshrined protection 
of markets and property rights from discretionary political intervention, independent regulatory 
authorities, central banks firmly protected from electoral pressures, and international institutions like 
the European Commission or the European Court of Justice that do not have to worry about popular 
reelection. Optimal, of course, would be some sort of assurance that government will always be in the 
hands of the likes of Thatcher and Reagan, commanding the courage and the muscle to shield the 
economy from the immodest demands of short-sighted citizens for protection and redistribution. It is 
not by chance, however, that such theories studiously avoid the crucial question of how to get from 
here to there, very likely because they have no answer, or at least none that it is opportune to make 
public.  
There are various ways to conceive of what is at the bottom of the friction between capitalism 
and democracy. For present purposes, I will characterize democratic capitalism as a political economy 
ruled by two conflicting institutionalized principles, or regimes, of resource allocation: one operating 
according to marginal productivity, or what is revealed as merit by a “free play of market forces,” and 
the other following social need, or entitlement, as certified by the collective choices of democratic 
politics. Governments under democratic capitalism are under pressure to honor both principles 
simultaneously although substantively the two almost never agree – or they can afford to neglect one 
in favor of the other only for a short time until they are punished by the consequences, political in one 
case and economic in the other. Governments that fail to attend to democratic claims for protection 
and redistribution risk losing their majority while governments that disregard the claims for 
compensation of the owners of productive resources, as expressed in the language of marginal 
productivity, cause economic dysfunctions and distortions that will be increasingly unsustainable and 
will thereby also undermine political support.  
In the liberal utopia of standard economic theory, the tension in democratic capitalism 
between its two principles of allocation is overcome by the theory turning into what Marx had 
expected his theory to become: a material force (materielle Gewalt). Economics as a “science” is to 
educate citizens and politicians that markets are better for them than politics, and that real justice is 
market justice under which everybody is rewarded according to contribution rather than to needs 
redefined as rights. To the extent that economic theory became in this sense accepted as a social 
                                                     
1 For example through nationalization of key firms and sectors, or as in Germany through “economic democracy” in the form 
of worker rights of “co-determination” in large companies.  
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theory, it would come true in the sense of becoming performative – which reveals its essentially 
rhetorical nature as an instrument of social construction by persuasion. In the real world, however, it is 
not all that easy to talk people out of their “irrational” belief in social and political as distinguished 
from market and property rights. Up to now at least, non-market notions of social justice have resisted 
all efforts at economistic rationalization, forceful as they may have become especially in the bleierne 
Zeit of advancing neoliberalism. Apparently people stubbornly refuse to give up on the idea of a moral 
economy (Thompson 1971; Scott 1976) under which they have rights as people or as citizens that take 
precedence over market exchanges.2 In fact where they have a chance, as they inevitably do as long as 
there is democracy, they tend in one way or other to insist on the primacy of the social over the 
economic, on social commitments and obligations being protected from market pressures for 
“flexibility,” and on society honoring human expectations of a life outside of the dictatorship of ever 
fluctuating “market signals.”3 
In the economic mainstream, that there should be a conflict in a market economy between 
rivaling principles of allocation can be explained only by a deplorable lack of economic education of 
citizens, or by demagoguery on the part of irresponsible politicians. Economic disorders like inflation, 
public deficits and excessive private or public debt result from insufficient knowledge of the economic 
laws that govern the functioning of the economy as a wealth creation machine, or from frivolous 
disregard of such laws in selfish pursuit of political power. This is quite different in theories of 
political economy, to the extent that they take the political seriously.4 Such theories recognize market 
allocation as one political-economic regime among others, one that is governed by the special interests 
of those owning scarce productive resources that put them in a strong market position, while its 
alternative, political allocation, is preferred by those with little economic but potentially high political 
power. From this perspective, standard economics is at base the theoretical exaltation of a political-
economic social order that serves the interests of those well-endowed with market power, in that it 
equates their interests with the general interest and represents the distributional claims of the owners 
of productive capital as technical imperatives of good, in the sense of scientifically sound, economic 
management. In fact for political economy, if standard economists account for economic dysfunctions 
by a cleavage between traditionalist principles of moral economy and rational-modern principles of 
economic economy, this amounts to a tendentious misrepresentation of the nature of the problem as it 
hides the fact that the economic economy is also a moral economy, namely that of those commanding 
strong power in markets for productive resources. 
In the language of mainstream economics, economic disturbances, as caused by market 
allocation being interfered with by political intervention, appear as punishment for governments 
failing to respect the natural laws that are the true governors of “the economy.” By contrast, a theory 
of political economy worth its name accounts for crises as manifestations of what one could call the 
Kaleckian reactions5 of the owners of productive resources to democratic politics penetrating into 
                                                     
2 The exact content of such rights may change and obviously differs between social and geographical locations. But certain 
elements seem universal, for example that someone who puts in a “good day’s work” should not be poor, meaning that 
his income should enable him and his family fully to participate in the life of his community. Other common principles of 
moral economy include insistence on attributions of social worth different from economic worth, and on values end 
entitlements that cannot be expressed in terms of market prices. 
3 This, to me, is the essence of what Polanyi (Polanyi 1957 [1944]) means when he writes of a “countermovement” against 
the commodification of labor (Streeck 2009, 246ff.). 
4 i.e., that they are not just functionalist efficiency theories.  
5 In a seminal essay in 1943, Michal Kalecki identified the “confidence” of investors as a crucial factor determining 
economic performance (Kalecki 1943). Investor confidence, according to Kalecki, depends on the extent to which current 
profit expectations of capital owners are reliably sanctioned by the distribution of political power and the policies flowing 
from it. Economic dysfunctions – in Kalecki’s case: unemployment – ensue when business sees its profit expectations 
threatened by political interference. “Wrong” policies in this sense result in a loss of business confidence, which in turn 
may result eventually in what amounts to an investment strike of capital owners. Kalecki’s perspective makes it possible 
to model a capitalist economy as an interactive game, as distinguished from a nature or machine-like mechanism with set 
parameters. If the economy is in a Kaleckian way conceived as interactive, the point at which capitalists react adversely 
to non-market allocation by withdrawing investment need not be seen as once and for all fixed and mathematically 
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what they insist on being their exclusive domain, making it difficult for them to exploit their market 
power to the fullest and thereby violating their expectations of being justly rewarded for their astute 
risk-taking.6 Unlike political economy, standard economic theory treats social structure and the 
distribution of interests and power vested in it as exogenous, holding them constant and thereby 
making them both invisible and, for the purposes of economic “science,” naturally given. The only 
politics this can envisage is the dabbling with economic laws by opportunistic or, at best, ignorant 
politicians as any good economic policy is nonpolitical by definition. This view is, however, not 
shared by the many for whom politics is a much needed recourse against markets whose unfettered 
operation interferes with what they happen to feel is right. Unless they are somehow persuaded to 
adopt neoclassical economics as a self-evident model of what social life is and should be – unless, in 
other words, they are turned into practicing life-world economizers – their political demands as 
democratically expressed will differ from the prescriptions of standard economic theory. The 
implication is that, while an economy, if sufficiently conceptually disembedded, may be modeled as 
tending toward equilibrium, a political economy cannot unless it is one without democracy, run by a 
Platonic dictatorship of economist-kings.  
As long as capitalist politics fails to lead democratic societies out of the desert of corrupt 
democratic opportunism into the promised land of self-regulating markets, therefore, governments 
must fear their societies being torn apart by conflicts over distributional claims that summed up 
considerably exceed what is available for distribution. Unless during the, as we now know, short and 
rare periods when strong economic growth makes it possible for all parties to improve their position 
simultaneously, democratic governments thus find themselves under pressure to convert, by whatever 
means, zero-sum into positive-sum distributional games. In democratic capitalism after the end of 
postwar growth, this has been done by moving additional, not yet existing resources into the pool out 
of which distributional claims were settled. As we will see, different methods were successively 
employed to pull forward resources that were still to be produced for present distribution and 
consumption. None of these lasted long as all of them were bound ultimately to issue in economic 
crisis, by provoking the resistance, and indeed the Kaleckian reactions, of those interested above all in 
sound market economics. 
 
II. 
Postwar democratic capitalism underwent its first crisis in the decade following the late 1960s when 
inflation rates began rapidly to rise throughout the Western world. Accelerating inflation resulted 
when declining economic growth made it difficult to sustain the political-economic peace formula 
between capital and labor that had ended domestic strife after the devastations of the Second World 
War. Essentially it entailed acceptance by the organized working classes of capitalist markets and 
property rights in exchange for political democracy providing for social security and a steadily rising 
standard of living. When the 1960s came to a close, more than two decades of uninterrupted economic 
growth had resulted in deeply rooted popular perceptions of continuous economic progress as a right 
of democratic citizenship – perceptions that translated into political expectations that governments felt 
constrained to honor but were less and less able to when growth began to slow down. 
The structure of the “postwar settlement,” as it came to be called, between labor and capital 
was fundamentally the same across the otherwise widely different countries where democratic 
capitalism had come to be instituted. In addition to an expanding welfare state, it included a right of 
workers to free collective bargaining through independent trade unions, as well as a political guarantee 
(Contd.)                                                                    
predictable but may be negotiable. It may also be set by a historically evolved and changeable level of aspiration or, for 
that matter, by strategic calculation. This is why predictions based on universalistic, i.e., historically and culturally 
indiscriminate, economic models are so often disproven: they assume fixed parameters where in reality they are socially 
determined and historically flexible. 
6 In other words, standard economic accounts of economic crises are essentially a representation of the strategic reactions of 
the owners of indispensible productive resources in the form of sets of simultaneous equations, making what are the 
particular claims to economic justice of a social group appear like the laws of gravity driving the motions of the stars in a 
Newtonian universe. 
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of full employment, underwritten by governments liberally applying the toolkit of Keynesian 
economic policy. When growth began to falter, the latter two in particular became difficult to maintain 
alongside each other. While free collective bargaining enabled workers through their unions to act 
effectively on their meanwhile firmly ingrained expectations of regular yearly wage increases, 
governments’ commitment to full employment, together with a growing welfare state, protected 
unions from potential employment losses caused by wage settlements in excess of productivity 
growth. Government economic policy thus increased the bargaining power of trade unions far beyond 
what a free labor market would have sustained. In the late 1960s this found expression in a worldwide 
wave of labor militancy fueled by a strong sense of political entitlement to a continuously improving 
standard of living coinciding with lack of fear of unemployment. 
In subsequent years governments all over the Western world faced the question of how to 
make trade unions moderate their members’ wage demands without having to rescind the Keynesian 
promise of secure full employment. In countries where the institutional structure of the collective 
bargaining system was not conducive to the negotiation of tripartite “social pacts,” governments 
remained throughout the 1970s convinced that allowing unemployment to rise in order to contain real 
wage increases was too risky for their own survival, if not for the stability of the capitalist system as 
such. Their only way out was an accommodating monetary policy that, while it allowed free collective 
bargaining and full employment to coexist, did so at the expense of an increase in the going rate of 
inflation, with a risk of inflation accelerating with time. 
At first and for a limited period, inflation is not much of a problem for workers represented by 
strong trade unions and politically powerful enough to achieve de facto or de jure wage indexation. 
Inflation comes primarily at the expense of holders of financial assets and of creditors, groups that do 
not as a rule include workers, or at least did not in the 1960s and 1970s. This is why it can be and has 
been described as a monetary reflection of distributional conflict between a working class demanding 
both employment security and a higher share in their country’s economy, and a capitalist class in 
command of profit-maximizing firms striving to maximize the return on its capital. As the two sides 
act on mutually incompatible ideas of what is theirs, one emphasizing rights and entitlements and the 
other productivity and achievement, inflation may also be considered an expression of anomy in a 
society which for structural reasons cannot agree on common criteria of social justice. It was in this 
sense that the eminent British sociologist, John Goldthorpe, in the late 1970s suggested that high and 
indeed accelerating inflation was ineradicable in a democratic-capitalist market economy allowing 
workers and citizens to organize politically to attempt to correct market outcomes through collective 
action (Goldthorpe 1978; Hirsch and Goldthorpe 1978). 
For governments facing conflicting demands from workers and capital owners in a world of 
declining growth rates, an accommodating monetary policy and the resulting inflation served as a 
welcome ersatz method for turning zero-sum into positive-sum social conflict. In the immediate 
postwar years it had been economic growth that had provided governments, having to attend 
simultaneously to incompatible concepts of economic justice, with excess goods and services enabling 
them to defuse the class conflict inherent in a capitalist political economy. Now they were reduced to 
excess money as yet uncovered by the real economy, pulling forward future resources into present 
consumption and distributional politics. This way of conflict pacification, however, effective as it at 
first was, could not indefinitely be continued. As Friedrich von Hayek (Hayek 1967 [1950]) in 
particular had never tired to point out, sustained and, with time very likely, accelerating inflation is 
bound to give rise to all sorts of, ultimately unmanageable, economic distortions, among other things 
in relative prices, the relation between contingent and fixed incomes, and especially in what 
economists refer to as economic incentives. In the end inflation, by calling forth Kaleckian reactions 
from increasingly suspicious capital owners, even began to produce unemployment, punishing not just 
the owners of property but also the very workers whose interests it may initially have served. It was at 
this point at the latest that governments under democratic capitalism came under pressure to cease 
accommodating redistributive wage settlements and restore monetary stability.  
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III. 
Inflation was conquered in the early 1980s (Diagram 1) when the Federal Reserve Bank of the United 
States under its new chairman, Paul Volker, who had been appointed in 1979, still under the Carter 
presidency, raised interest rates to an unprecedented height, causing unemployment to jump to levels 
never seen since the Great Depression.7 The Volcker revolution, or one might also speak of the 
Volcker putsch, was sealed when President Reagan, who is said to have initially been afraid of the 
political fallout of Volcker’s aggressive disinflation policies, was re-elected in 1984. Before him, 
Margaret Thatcher, who had followed the American lead, had won a second term in June, 1983, also 
in spite of high unemployment and rapid de-industrialization caused, among other things, by a 
restrictive monetary policy. In both the U.S. and the UK, disinflation was accompanied by fierce and 
in the end highly successful attacks by governments and employers on trade unions, epitomized by 
Reagan’s victory over the Air Traffic Controllers and Thatcher’s breaking of the National Union of 
Mineworkers. In subsequent years, inflation rates throughout the capitalist world remained 
continuously low while unemployment went more or less steadily up (Diagram 2). In parallel, 
unionization declined almost everywhere, and strikes became so infrequent that some countries ceased 
to keep strike statistics (Diagram 3). 
The neoliberal era began with Anglo-American governments casting aside the political 
orthodoxy of postwar democratic capitalism. It entailed that inflation was always preferable to 
unemployment as unemployment would be certain to undermine political support, not just for the 
government of the day, but also for democratic capitalism as a political-economic regime. The 
experiments conducted by Reagan and Thatcher on their electorates were observed with great attention 
by policy-makers all over the Western world. Those, however, who may have hoped that the end of 
inflation would mean an end to economic disorder were soon to be disappointed. As inflation receded, 
public debt began to increase, and not entirely unexpectedly so. Already in the 1950s Anthony Downs 
(see for example Downs 1960) had noted a tendency in a democracy for the demands of citizens for 
public services to exceed the supply of resources available to government, and as early as the late 
1960s the Marxist scholar, James O’Connor, sympathetically commented upon by none other than 
Daniel Bell (Bell 1976), had seen emerging on the horizon of contemporary capitalism an endemic 
“fiscal crisis of the state” (O'Connor 1970a; b; 1972; 1973). 
Rising public debt in the 1980s had many causes. Stagnant growth had made taxpayers more 
averse than ever to taxation, and with the end of inflation, automatic tax increases through what was 
called “bracket creep” came to an end as well. The same held for the continuous devaluation of public 
debt in the wake of the devaluation of national currencies, a process that had first complemented, and 
then increasingly substituted, for economic growth reducing the relative size of a country’s 
accumulated debt. On the expenditure side, rising unemployment, caused by monetary stabilization, 
required rising expenditures on social assistance, and various social entitlements created in the 1970s 
in return for trade union wage moderation – as it were, deferred wages from the neo-corporatist era – 
began to mature and came due, increasingly weighing on public households.  
With inflation no longer available for closing the gap between the demands of citizens on the 
one hand and of “the markets” on the other, the burden of securing social peace fell on the state and on 
public finance. Public debt turned out, for a while, to be a convenient functional equivalent of 
inflation. Like the latter, it made it possible to introduce in the distributional conflicts of the time 
resources that had not yet in fact been produced: enabling governments to draw on future resources to 
add to what was already on hand for distribution at present. What had changed was the way in which 
resources were pulled forward in time to make politically irresistible or economically irrefutable 
demands compatible that could not be simultaneously fulfilled with existing economic resources. As 
the struggle between market and social distribution moved from the labor market to the political arena, 
electoral pressure took the place of trade union pressure. To accommodate demands for benefits and 
services as a citizen’s right, as well as competing claims for incomes reflecting as closely as possible 
the judgment of the market, thus providing incentives for an efficient use of productive resources, 
                                                     
7 On the following see Samuelson (2010), among others. 
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governments, instead of inflating the currency, began to borrow on an increasing scale. Low inflation 
was helpful in this since it assured creditors that government bonds would keep their value, even over 
the long haul; and so were the low interest rates that had resulted when inflation was stamped out. 
Just like inflation, however, accumulation of public debt cannot go on indefinitely. 
Economists have always warned of public deficit spending “crowding out” private investment, causing 
high interest rates and low growth. But they were never able to specify where exactly the critical 
threshold was. In actual practice, it turned out to be possible, at least for a while, to keep interest rates 
low by deregulating financial markets (Krippner 2011) while containing inflation through continued 
union-busting. Still, the U.S. in particular, with its particularly low national savings rate, soon had to 
sell its government bonds not just to citizens but also to foreign investors, including sovereign wealth 
funds of various sorts (Spiro 1999). Moreover, as debt burdens rose, a growing share of public 
spending had to be devoted to debt service, even with interest rates remaining low – which could, 
however, not forever be taken for granted. Above all, there had to be a point, although apparently 
unknowable beforehand, at which creditors, foreign and domestic alike, would begin to worry about 
getting their money back eventually. By then at the latest, pressures would begin to mount from 
“financial markets” for consolidation of public budgets and a return to fiscal discipline. 
 
IV. 
The dominant theme of the 1992 Presidential election in the United States was the two deficits, of the 
Federal Government and of the country in foreign trade. The victory of Bill Clinton, who had 
campaigned above all on the “double deficit,” set off worldwide attempts at fiscal consolidation, 
aggressively promoted under American leadership by international organizations such as the OECD. 
Initially the Clinton administration seems to have envisaged closing the public deficit by accelerated 
economic growth brought about by social reform, like increased public investment in education (Reich 
1997). Having lost in the midterm elections of 1994 its majority in both houses of Congress, however, 
it soon turned to a policy of austerity involving deep cuts in public spending, including changes in 
social policy which, in the words of the President, were to put an end to “welfare as we know it.”8 
Indeed in the three final years of the Clinton Presidency, from 1998 to 2000, the U.S. Federal 
Government for the first time in decades was running a budget surplus. 
This is not to say, however, that Clinton had somehow found a way of pacifying a democratic-
capitalist political economy without recourse to additional, as yet to be produced economic resources. 
The Clinton strategy of social pacification drew heavily on the deregulation of the financial sector that 
had started already under Reagan and was now driven further than ever before (Stiglitz 2003). Rapidly 
rising income inequality and sharp cuts in social spending, as well as the reduction in aggregate 
demand caused by fiscal consolidation, were counterbalanced by unprecedented new opportunities for 
citizens and firms to indebt themselves. It was Colin Crouch who coined the fortuitous term, 
“privatized Keynesianism,” for what was in effect the replacement of public with private debt (Crouch 
2009). What this amounted to was that, rather than the government borrowing money to fund equal 
access to decent housing or the formation of marketable work skills, it was now individual citizens 
who, under a debt regime of extreme generosity, were allowed, and in fact compelled, to take up a 
loan at their own risk with which to pay for their education or their advancement to a less destitute 
urban neighborhood. 
The Clinton policy of fiscal consolidation and economic revitalization through financial 
deregulation had many beneficiaries. The rich were spared higher taxes while those among them – a 
fast-growing share – who had been wise enough to move their interests into the financial sector were 
making huge profits on the ever more complicated so-called “financial services” that they now had an 
almost unlimited license to sell. But the poor also prospered, at least some of them and for a while. 
Subprime mortgages became a substitute, however illusory in the end, for the social policy that was 
simultaneously being scrapped, as well as for the wage increases that were no longer forthcoming at 
the lower end of a more and more flexible, de-unionized labor market. For African-Americans in 
                                                     
8 With the “Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act” of 1996. 
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particular, owning their home was not just the “American dream” come true but also a much-needed 
substitute for the old-age pension they were unable to earn in the labor markets of the day and that 
they had no reason to expect from a government pledged to a policy of strict austerity.  
In fact for a time, home ownership offered the middle class and even some of the poor an 
attractive opportunity to participate in the speculative craze that was making the rich so much richer in 
the 1990s and early 2000s, treacherous as that opportunity as well would later turn out to have been. 
As house prices escalated under rising demand from people who would in normal circumstances never 
have been able to buy a house, it became common practice to use the new financial instruments to 
extract part or all of one’s home equity to finance the – rapidly rising – costs of the next generation’s 
college education, or simply for personal consumption offsetting stagnant or declining wages. Nor was 
it entirely uncommon for home owners to use their new credit to buy a second or third house, in the 
hope to cash in on what was somehow expected to be an open-ended increase in the market value of 
real estate. In this way, unlike the era of public debt when future resources were procured for present 
use by government borrowing, now they were pulled forward by a myriad of individuals selling in 
liberalized financial markets more or less solemn commitments to pay a significant share of their 
expected future earnings to creditors, who in return provided them with instant power to purchase 
whatever they needed or liked. Financial liberalization thus compensated for social policy being cut in 
an era of fiscal consolidation and public austerity, as individual debt replaced public debt and 
individual demand, constructed for high fees by a rapidly growing money-making industry, took the 
place of collective demand governed by the state, in supporting employment and profits in industries 
far beyond “financial services,” like in construction (Diagram 4). 
Especially after 2001 when the Federal Reserve switched to very low interest rates to prevent 
an economic slump, with the inevitable return of high unemployment it implied, the new financial 
freedoms that had made the privatization of Keynesianism possible sustained, in addition to 
unprecedented profits in the financial sector, a booming economy that became the envy not least of the 
European Left. In fact Alan Greenspan’s policy of easy money supporting the rapidly growing 
indebtedness of American society was held up as a model by European trade unions, which never tired 
to note that unlike the European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve was bound by law not just to 
provide for monetary stability but also for a high level of employment. All of this, of course, ended 
when in 2008 the international credit pyramid on which the prosperity of the late 1990s and early 
2000s had rested suddenly collapsed. 
 
V. 
With the crash of privatized Keynesianism, the crisis of postwar democratic capitalism entered into its 
fourth and, up to now, latest stage, after the successive eras of inflation, public deficits, and private 
indebtedness (Diagram 59). When the global financial system was about to disintegrate, nation-states 
had to restore economic confidence by socializing the bad loans licensed in compensation for fiscal 
consolidation. Together with the fiscal expansion necessary to prevent a breakdown of what the 
Germans call the Realökonomie, this resulted in a dramatic new increase in public deficits and public 
debt – a development that, it may be worth noting, was not at all due to frivolous overspending by 
opportunistic politicians as implied by public choice theories, or to misconceived public institutions as 
suggested by a broad institutional economics literature produced in the 1990s under the auspices of, 
among others, the World Bank and the IMF (for a representative collection see Poterba and von Hagen 
1999).  
The quantum leap in public indebtedness after 2008, which undid whatever fiscal 
consolidation might have been achieved in the preceding decade, reflected the fact that no democratic 
state could have dared to impose on its society another economic crisis of the dimension of the Great 
                                                     
9 The diagram shows the development in the lead capitalist country, the United States, where the four stages unfold in ideal-
typical fashion. For other countries it is necessary to make allowances, reflecting their particular circumstances, including 
their position in the global political economy. In Germany, for example, public debt began to rise sharply already in the 
1970s, which corresponds to the fact that inflation was at a record low long before Volcker, due to the institutional 
independence of the Bundesbank and the monetarist policies it adopted as early as 1974 (Scharpf 1991). 
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Depression of the 1930s, as punishment for the excesses of a deregulated global money industry. Once 
again, political power was deployed to make future resources available for securing present social 
peace, in that states more or less voluntarily took upon themselves a significant share of the new debt 
originally created in the private sector, thereby reassuring the creditors. But while this effectively 
rescued the money factories of the financial industry, reinstating in very short time their extraordinary 
profits, salaries, and bonuses, it did not and could not prevent rising suspicions on the part of the very 
same “financial markets” that governments had just saved from the consequences of their own 
indiscretion, that in the process states might have overextended themselves. Even with the global 
economic crisis far from over, creditors begin vociferously to demand a return to sound money 
through fiscal austerity, in search for reassurance that their vastly increased investment in government 
debt would not be lost. 
In the years after 2008, distributional conflict under democratic capitalism has turned into a 
complicated tug-of-war between global financial markets and sovereign national states. Where in the 
past workers struggled with employers, citizens with governments, and private debtors with private 
creditors, it is now financial institutions wrestling with the same states that they had only recently 
successfully blackmailed into saving them from themselves. While this is what we see on the surface, 
however, the underlying configuration of power and interests is far more complex and still awaits 
systematic exploration. For example, financial markets have since the crisis returned to charging 
different states widely different interest rates, thereby differentiating the pressure they apply on 
governments to make their citizens acquiesce with unprecedented spending cuts in line, again, with a 
basically unmodified market logic of distribution. In fact, given the amount of debt carried by most 
states today, even minor increases in the rate of interest on government bonds could cause fiscal 
disaster.10 At the same time, markets must avoid states declaring sovereign bankruptcy, which they 
always can if market pressures become too strong. This is why other states have to be found that take 
it on themselves to bail out those most at risk, in an effort to protect themselves from a general 
increase in interest rates on government bonds once the first state has defaulted. Solidarity between 
states in the interest of investors, if one can call it this, is also fostered where sovereign default would 
hit banks located in another country, which might force that country’s government once again to 
nationalize huge amounts of bad debt in order to stabilize its domestic economy.  
There are still more facets to the way in which the tension in democratic capitalism between 
demands for social rights and the claims and outcomes of free markets currently expresses itself. Some 
governments, foremost among them the Obama administration, are making desperate attempts to 
generate renewed economic growth through even more debt – in the hope of later consolidation 
policies, should they become inevitable, being assisted by a sizeable growth dividend. Others may be 
secretly looking for a return to inflation, as a way of melting down accumulated debt by softly 
expropriating creditors, which would like economic growth mitigate the political tensions to be 
expected from policies of austerity. At the same time, financial markets, together with academic 
economists, may be looking forward to a last and, given the nature of the new battlefield, highly 
promising fight against political interference with the forces of the market, reinstating market 
discipline once and for all and ending decisively any government attempt to undermine it. 
Further complications arise from the fact that financial markets, whoever they may be, need 
government debt for safe investment, and pressing too hard for balanced budgets may deprive them of 
important investment opportunities. The middle classes of the rich countries in particular have put a 
good part of their savings into government bonds, not to mention workers now heavily invested in 
supplementary pensions. Balanced budgets would likely mean that the state would have to take away 
from the middle classes in the form of higher taxes what they now can save and invest, among other 
things in the state. Not only would they lose the interest, but they could also no longer pass their 
savings on to their children. However, while this should make them interested in states being, if not 
debt-free, then reliably able to fulfill their obligations to their creditors, it may mean that they would 
                                                     
10 For a state with public debt equaling 100 percent of GDP, an increase by two percentage points in the average rate of 
interest it has to pay to its creditors would raise its yearly deficit by the same amount. A current deficit of four percent of 
GDP would as a result increase by half.  
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have to pay for their government’s liquidity in the form of deep cuts in public benefits and services on 
which they also, in part, depend. 
At the end of the day, however complicated the cross-cutting cleavages between the various 
interests in the emerging new field of the international politics of public debt may be, the price for 
financial stabilization is likely to be paid by others than the owners of money, or at least of real 
money. For example, public pensions reform will be accelerated by fiscal pressures at home and 
abroad, and to the extent that governments default anywhere in the world, private pensions will be hit 
as well. The average citizen will pay – for the consolidation of public finances, the bankruptcy of 
foreign states, the rising rates of interest on the public debt and, if necessary and still possible, another 
rescue of national and international banks – with his or her private savings, with cuts in public 
entitlements, with reduced public services and, one way or other, with higher taxes. 
 
VI. 
In the four decades since the end of postwar growth, the epicenter of the tectonic tension inside the 
political economy of democratic capitalism has migrated from one institutional location to the next, in 
the course giving rise to a sequence of different but systematically related economic disturbances. In 
the 1970s the conflict between democratic claims for social justice and capitalist demands for 
distribution by marginal productivity played itself out primarily in national labor markets where trade 
union wage pressure under politically guaranteed full employment caused accelerating inflation. When 
what was in effect redistribution by debasement of the currency became economically unsustainable, 
forcing governments under high political risks to put an end to it, the conflict reemerged in the 
electoral arena. Here it gave rise to a growing disparity between public spending and public revenues, 
and as a consequence to rapidly rising public debt, in response to voter demands for benefits and 
services in excess of what a democratic-capitalist economy could be made to hand over to its “tax 
state” (Schumpeter 1991 [1918]). 
Just as inflation, conflict management by deficit spending could not continue indefinitely. To 
secure social peace, however, efforts to rein in public debt, when they became unavoidable, had to be 
accompanied by financial deregulation easing access to private credit, as an alternative route to 
accommodating normatively popular and politically powerful demands of citizens for security and 
prosperity. This, too, lasted not much longer than a decade, until the global economy almost faltered 
under the burden of the unrealistic promises, of future payment for present consumption and 
investment, licensed by governments as compensation for fiscal austerity. Since then, the clash 
between popular ideas of social justice and economic insistence on market justice has once again 
changed sites, re-emerging this time in international capital markets and the complex contests 
currently taking place there between financial institutions, electorates, governments, states and 
international organizations. Now the issue is how far states can and must go in enforcing on their 
citizens the property rights and profit expectations of what calls itself “the markets,” to save 
themselves from bankruptcy while protecting as best they can what may still have remained of their 
democratic legitimacy. 
Toleration of inflation, acceptance of public debt, and deregulation of private credit were no 
more than temporary stopgaps for governments confronted with the apparently irrepressible conflict 
between the two contradictory principles of allocation under democratic capitalism, social rights on 
the one hand and marginal productivity, as determined by the relationship between supply and 
demand, on the other. Each of the three worked for while until they began to cause more problems 
than they solved, indicating that a lasting reconciliation of social and economic stability in capitalist 
democracies is no more than a utopian project. Eventually, all that governments were able to achieve 
in dealing with the crises of their day was to make them assume new forms and reappear in new 
places. There is no reason to believe that the contradictions inherent in democratic capitalism, with 
their successive manifestation in ever new varieties of economic disorder, should today have 
disappeared.  
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VII. 
The capacity of the social sciences to make predictions is limited if it exists at all. Like evolutionary 
biology, social science may, if it does its work well, provide plausible interpretations of the past in the 
form of systematically comparable historical reconstructions of chains of events that at first glance 
may appear nothing but chaotic. Looking forward, however, the social scientist faces the same open 
future as anybody else. Nevertheless, it appears to me that one can say with some certainty that the 
political manageability of democratic capitalism has in recent years sharply declined, obviously in 
some countries more than in others, but also and more importantly overall, in the emerging global 
political-economic system. As a result the risks seem to be growing, both for democracy and for the 
economy.  
Beginning with the latter, it would seem that economic policy-makers have rarely if ever since 
the Great Depression been faced with as much uncertainty as today. One example among many is that 
“the markets” expect not just fiscal consolidation but also and at the same time a reasonable prospect 
of future economic growth. How the two may be combined, however, is not at all easy to say. 
Although the risk premium on Irish government debt fell when the country pledged itself to aggressive 
deficit reduction, a few weeks later it rose again, allegedly because the country’s consolidation 
program suddenly appeared so strict that it would make economic recovery impossible.11 Moreover, 
among those who must know one finds a widely shared conviction that the next bubble is already 
building somewhere in a world that is more than ever flooded with cheap money. Subprime mortgages 
may no longer offer themselves for investment, at least not for the time being. But there are the 
markets for raw materials, or the new internet economy. Nothing prevents financial firms from using 
the surplus of money the central banks provide them with, for entering whatever appear to be the new 
growth sectors, on behalf of their favorite clients and, of course, of themselves. After all, regulatory 
reform in the financial sector having failed in almost all respects, capital requirements are still as low 
as they were, and the banks that were too big to fail in 2008 can count on being so also in 2012 or 
2013, which leaves them with the same capacity for blackmailing the public that they were able to 
deploy so skillfully three years ago. But then, the public bailout of private capitalism on the model of 
2008 may be impossible to repeat, if only because public finances are already now stretched beyond 
their limit. 
As I said, it is not for the social scientist to make predictions, for example on where the next 
bubble may burst; on whether the United States will continue to find creditors willing to finance their 
apparently ineradicable double deficit; whether it will be possible or not to impose the costs of 
consolidation entirely on pensioners and public sector workers, so as to spare “the markets” from 
economic hardship; or to what extent economic growth or inflation will be forthcoming to ease 
countries’ debt burdens. What we do know, however, is that democracy is as much at risk in the 
current crisis as the economy. Using concepts developed long ago by the British sociologist David 
Lockwood (Lockwood 1964), not only has the system integration of contemporary societies – that is, 
the efficient functioning of their capitalist economies – become precarious, but also their social 
integration. With the arrival of a new age of austerity, the capacity of national states to mediate 
between what in the past were the rights of citizens on the one hand and the evolving requirements of 
capital accumulation on the other has profoundly suffered. For example, governments everywhere face 
stronger resistance to tax increases than ever, in particular in highly indebted countries where fresh 
public money would for many years have to be spent to pay for goods that have long been consumed. 
Even more importantly, with continuously increasing global interdependence the times are over when 
it could still be pretended that the tensions between economy and society, and indeed between 
capitalism and democracy, could be handled inside national political communities. No government can 
today govern without paying very close attention to international constraints and obligations, in 
particular to obligations in financial markets forcing it to impose sacrifices on its population. The 
crises and contradictions of democratic capitalism have finally become internationalized, playing 
                                                     
11 In other words, one has to believe, in true-blue supply-side fashion, that growth is stimulated by cuts rather than increases 
in public spending. Apparently even “the markets” are unwilling to put their money on this. A question like, How much 
new debt is required for a country to be able to outgrow its old debt?, is a tricky one indeed. 
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themselves out not just within states but also between them, and simultaneously at both levels in as yet 
unexplored combinations and permutations. 
As we now read in the papers almost every day, “the markets” have in unprecedented ways 
begun to dictate what presumably sovereign and democratic states may still do for their citizens and 
what they must refuse them. The very same ratings agencies that were instrumental for bringing about 
the disaster of the global money industry are now threatening to downgrade the bonds of the very 
same states that had to accept a previously unimaginable level of new debt to rescue that industry and 
the capitalist economy as a whole. Politics still contains and distorts markets, but only, it seems, at a 
level far remote from the daily experience and the political and organizational capacities of normal 
people: the U.S., armed to its teeth not just with aircraft carriers but also with an unlimited supply of 
credit cards for the most militant shoppers in human history, still gets China to buy its mounting debt 
and manages to muscle the three global ratings firms, all based at the southern tip of Manhattan, into 
awarding its government bonds the triple A to which it feels entitled forever. All others, however, 
have to listen to what “the markets” tell them. As a result citizens are increasingly perceiving their 
national governments, not as their agents, but as the agents of other states or of international 
organizations, like the IMF or the European Union, that are immeasurably more insulated from 
electoral pressure than was the traditional nation-state. In countries like Greece and Ireland in 
particular, anything resembling democracy will be effectively suspended for many years as national 
governments of whatever political color, forced to behave responsibly as defined by international 
markets and organizations, will have to impose strict austerity on their societies, at the price of 
becoming increasingly unresponsive to their citizens (Mair 2009). 
Democracy is being preempted not just in those countries, however, that are currently under 
attack by “the markets.” Germany, which is still doing relatively well, is doing so not least because it 
has committed itself to decades of public expenditure cuts. In addition, the German government had, 
and will again have, to get its citizens to provide liquidity to countries at risk of defaulting, not just to 
save German banks, but also to stabilize the common European currency and prevent a general 
increase in the rate of interest on public debt, as would likely occur in the case of the first country 
collapsing. How politically costly this is is documented by the progressive decay of the electoral 
capital of the Merkel government, culminating up to now12 in two crushing defeats in major regional 
elections. Populist rhetoric to the effect that perhaps creditors should also pay a share of the costs, as 
vented by the Chancellor in early 2010, was quickly abandoned when “the markets” expressed shock 
by slightly raising the rate of interest on new public debt. Now the talk is about the need to shift, in the 
words of the German Finance Minister, from old-fashioned “government,” which is no longer up to 
the new challenges of globalization, to “governance,” meaning in particular a lasting curtailment of the 
budgetary authority of the Bundestag.13 
In several ways, the political expectations democratic states are today facing from their new 
principals are such that they may be impossible to meet. International markets and organizations 
require that not just governments but also citizens credibly commit themselves to fiscal consolidation. 
Political parties that oppose austerity must be resoundingly defeated in national elections, and both 
government and opposition must be equally pledged to “sound finance,” or else the cost of debt 
service will inexorably rise. Elections in which voters have no effective choice, however, may be 
perceived by them as inauthentic, which may cause all sorts of political disorder, from declining 
turnout to a rise of populist parties to riots in the streets. What may at first sight help is that the arenas 
of distributional conflict have with time become ever more remote from popular politics. Compared to 
the fiscal diplomacy and the international capital markets of today, the national labor markets of the 
                                                     
12 April 2011. 
13 Wolfgang Schäuble, in an interview with the Financial Times, December 5, 2010. “We need new forms of international 
governance, global governance and European governance… “ As summarized by the FT, “If the German parliament were 
asked for a vote today on giving up national budgetary authority, ‘you would not get a Yes vote,’ he added. But ‘if you 
would give us some months to work on this, and if you give us the hope that other member states will agree as well, I 
would see a chance.’ Schäuble was, fittingly, “speaking as winner of the FT competition for European finance minister of 
the year.” 
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1970s, with the manifold opportunities they offered for corporatist political mobilization and inter-
class coalitions, and the politics of public finance of the 1980s were not necessarily beyond either the 
grasp or the strategic reach of the “man in the street.” Since then, the battlefields on which the 
contradictions of democratic capitalism are fought out have become ever more complex, making it 
exceedingly difficult for anyone outside of the political and financial elites to recognize the underlying 
interests and identify their own.14 While this may generate apathy at the mass level and thereby make 
life easier at the elite level, however, there is no relying on it in a world in which blind compliance 
with the demands of financial investors is made to appear the only institutionally rational and 
responsible behavior. To those who refuse to be talked out of other, social rationalities and 
responsibilities, such a world may at some point seem nothing but absurd, making it the only rational 
and responsible conduct to throw as many wrenches as possible into the works of haute finance. 
Where democracy as we know it is effectively suspended, as it already is in countries like Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal, street riots and popular insurrection could be the last remaining mode of political 
expression for those devoid of market power. Should we hope in the name of democracy that we will 
soon have the opportunity to observe a few examples? 
Social science can do little if anything to help resolve the structural tensions and 
contradictions underlying the economic and social disorders of the day. What it can do, however, is 
bring them to light and identify the historical continuities in which present crises can only be fully 
understood. It also can – and indeed I believe it must – point out the drama of democratic states being 
turned into debt collecting agencies on behalf of a global oligarchy of investors compared to which C. 
Wright Mills’ “power elite” (Mills 1956) must appear like a shining example of liberal pluralism. 
More than ever, economic power seems today to have become political power while citizens appear to 
be almost entirely stripped of their democratic defenses and their capacity to impress on the political 
economy interests and demands incommensurable with those of capital owners. Looking back at the 
democratic-capitalist crisis sequence since the 1970s, one cannot but be afraid of the possibility of a 
new, however temporary, settlement of social conflict in advanced capitalism, this time entirely in 
favor of the propertied classes firmly entrenched in their politically unconquerable institutional 
stronghold, the international financial industry.  
If democracy has anything at all to do with state intervention in the market economy for the 
sake of equality and social protection, then there can be no doubt that it is today fundamentally at risk, 
and will be so for some time to come. All the more important it will be for social science to 
rehabilitate theoretical traditions that conceive of contemporary societies as inherently conflictual and 
allow for a much more acute sense of change, crisis and potential catastrophe, rather than project an 
image of basic stability and of equilibrium easily restored if the right measures are taken by 
scientifically informed social engineers or institutional plumbers.  
 
                                                     
14 For example, political appeals for redistributive “solidarity” are now directed at entire nations that are asked by 
international organizations to support other nations, like Slovenia being urged to help out Ireland, Greece and Portugal. 
This hides the fact that those that are being supported by “international solidarity” are not the average people in the 
streets but the banks, domestic and foreign, that would otherwise have to accept lower profits. It also neglects differences 
in national income: while Germans are on average richer than Greeks (although some Greeks are much richer than most 
Germans), Slovenians are on average much poorer than the Irish, who have statistically a higher per capita income than 
almost all Euro countries, including Germany. Essentially the new conflict alignment translates class conflicts into 
international conflicts, pitting nations against each other that are all subject to the same financial market pressures for 
public austerity. Rather than from those who have long resumed collecting their “bonuses,” people are conditioned to 
demand “sacrifices” from other people who happen to be citizens of other states, which apparently makes the “sacrifices” 
they themselves are asked to make more acceptable for them. 
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Inflation Rates, Seven Countries, 1970-2010 
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Diagram 2 
 
Unemployment Rates, Seven Countries, 1970-2010 
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Diagram 3 
 
Strike Volume, Seven Countries, 1971-2007* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Days not worked per 1,000 employees, three-year moving averages 
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Diagram 4 
 
Fiscal Consolidation and Private Debt, Three Countries, 1995-2008  
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Diagram 5 
 
The United States: Four Crises of Democratic Capitalism, 1970-2010 
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